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This article deals with a discussion of Savulescu’s impersonal version of 
the Principle of Procreative Benefi cence and its relationship with a per-
son-affecting Principle of Harm in order to evaluate the cases of selection 
of which child to have. It aims to show some problems in Savulescu’s at-
tempt to arrange the two principles (the confl ict between benefi cence and 
harm, the limitation of benefi cence to pre-conception selection, the exten-
sion of benefi cence to different quantity people choice), and to propose an 
alternative version of Procreative Benefi cence (a narrow person-affecting 
version), in order to avoid these problems.
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1. Benefi cence and harm
Julian Savulescu has stated an important moral principle related to 
reproductive decisions concerning cases of children’s selection, at pres-
ent related to post-conception testing, like chorionic villus sampling 
or amniocentesis, or to pre-conception testing, like Pre-implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) and IVF.
This principle is a consequentialist principle, called the Principle 
of Procreative Benefi cence (PB). During the years, it has had different 
formulations:
Couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible chil-
dren they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as 
good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information. (Sa-
vulescu 2001: 415)
Or, according to a more recent formulation:
If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection 
is possible, then they have a signifi cant moral reason to select the child, of 
the possible children they could have, whose life can be expected, in light of 
the relevant available information, to go best or at least not worse than any 
of the others. (Savulescu and Kahane 2009: 274)
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According to this principle, there is a moral obligation to have the most 
advantaged child (the best child) of all the possible children that a cou-
ple can have. PB is a consequentialist maximizing principle: it states 
an obligation to have the child with the most well-being (a life with 
Memory, Intelligence, Empathy, etc.); and it is a comparative principle: 
it compares the well-being of the possible children the parents could 
have (Savulescu and Kahane 2009: 175).
A fi rst example of this principle’s application regards a case of selec-
tion related to a pre-conception test for asthma:
A couple is having IVF in an attempt to have a child. It produces two em-
bryos. A battery of tests for common diseases is performed. Embryo A has 
no abnormalities on the tests performed. Embryo B has no abnormalities on 
the tests performed except its genetic profi le reveals it has a predisposition 
to developing asthma. Which embryo should be implanted? Embryo B has 
nothing to be said in its favour over A and something against it. Embryo A 
should (on pain of irrationality) be implanted. (Savulescu 2001: 416)
A second example regards a case of selection related to a pre-conception 
test during rubella (an example derived from Parfi t):
A woman has rubella. If she conceives now, she will have a blind and deaf 
child. If she waits three months, she will conceive another different but 
healthy child. She should choose to wait until her rubella is passed. (Sa-
vulescu 2001: 417)
The Principle of Procreative Benefi cence states an important view in re-
production ethics, which is opposed to several anti-selection views (like 
that of the Roman Catholic Church or of other secular thinkers, like 
Sandel): “far from playing God, attempting to control our genetic fate is 
‘playing human’—trying to improve the odds of doing well in an uncer-
tain world of diffi culty, threat and misfortune” (Savulescu 2007: 284).
But PB is also opposed to some pro-selection views (like those of 
Glover or Agar) which give the couple moral permission, but not a 
moral obligation, to select. These views deny that we ought to select 
the most advantaged child, because they believe that reproduction is a 
private matter; or because they think that morality gives parents com-
plete freedom when they make procreative decisions, allowing them to 
aim at less than the best (Savulescu and Kahane 2009: 175).
Yet, according to Savulescu, there are limits on Procreative Benefi -
cence: the obligation is not an absolute obligation but a prima facie (a 
pro tanto) obligation, which has to be balanced with other prima facie 
obligations in order to became an effective, “all-things-considered over-
riding obligation” (Savulescu and Kahane 2017: 594). For this reason, 
Savulescu states that, in PB, ‘should’ means ‘have good reasons to’ or ‘is 
morally required’, and it is different from ‘must’. It implies that persua-
sion is justifi ed but coercion is not.
PB is not an absolute obligation. It is the claim that there is a signifi cant 
moral reason to choose the better child. The principle states not what people 
invariably must do but what they have signifi cant moral reason to do. (Sa-
vulescu and Kahane 2009: 278)
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In particular, it has to be balanced with another fundamental prin-
ciple: the Principle of Harm, that states a moral obligation not to harm 
others. This requirement was originally related, in Savulescu’s early 
articles, to a principle of Procreative Autonomy: “people should be free 
to do what others disapprove of or judge wrong, provided the exercise 
of freedom does not harm others” (Savulescu 2002). Explaining this 
principle, Savulescu refers directly to Mill’s liberalism, according to 
which an invasion of a person’s liberty is justifi ed only when that per-
son threatens to directly and seriously harm another person (Mill’s 
Principle of Harm) (Savulescu and Kahane 2017: 612).
Following such a non-harming restriction, Savulescu admits the 
couple’s free choice to select less than the most advantaged child. 
“There are strong philosophical grounds to hold that procreative liberty 
should extend to people selecting less than the best child” (Savulescu 
2014: 178).
Not surprisingly, there may be a confl ict between the two principles, 
and the solution proposed by Savulescu is to give precedence to the 
Principle of Harm, as we will see below. The result is “a liberal form 
of procreative perfectionism”, as Glover (2006: 54) defi ned Savulescu’s 
proposal, or a form of “libertarian consequentialism”.
2. A hybrid position
Like many other decisions in reproductive ethics, selection changes the 
identity of the children who will exist: “in selecting a more advantaged 
child we are also bringing a different person into existence” (Savulescu 
2009: 277).
In this way, selection is related to a well-known problem regard-
ing future generation ethics: the non-identity problem, due to the fact 
that our actions can change the identity of future people. Therefore, 
selection brings with itself the need to distinguish different ways of 
understanding normative principles applied in reproduction ethics: a 
person-affecting view and an impersonal view.
On the one hand, in Savlulescu, the Principle of Harm is intended 
as intrinsically related to a person-affecting restriction (in a narrow 
sense, as we will see later): “harm is personal in nature” (Savulescu 
2014: 178).
A “Person-affecting View” states that an act is right or wrong only if 
there is or will be a person affected by it” (Glover 1977: 66). According 
to this view: we have an obligation only toward actual or future people 
who will exist. As Narveson (1967: 63) writes: “in deciding what we are 
to do, the only consideration which is morally relevant […] is how oth-
ers would be affected. If we cannot envisage effects on certain people 
which would ensue from our acts, then we have no moral material to 
work on and we can do as we like”. Wrongs require victims: “what is 
bad must be bad for someone” (Parfi t 1984: 363).
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According to this person-affecting view, we do not benefi t a child if 
we bring him/her into life, but if his/her being alive is not worth living 
we harm a child by procreating him. “If, therefore, it is our duty to 
prevent suffering and relieve it, it is also our duty not to bring children 
into the world if we know that they would suffer or that we would infl ict 
suffering upon them” (Narveson 1967: 71).
On the other hand, in Savulescu, the Principle of Procreative Benef-
icence explicitly denies a person-affecting restriction: it is impersonal. 
According to such a view, an act is right or wrong even if there is or 
will be no person affected by it, but he/she could have existed if we had 
chosen otherwise. According to this view, we have an obligation even 
toward ‘merely possible people’, people who will not exist but whose 
existence depends on us; and a harm made to actual or possible people 
may be compensated for with a benefi t made to merely possible people 
and vice-versa (Hare 1988: 68; Kamm 2013: 291).
In this impersonal interpretation of PB, we have a different kind of 
harm: an impersonal harm, a harm without a victim, which makes the 
world a worse place. As Savulescu states: “It is bad that blind and deaf 
children are born when sighted and hearing children could have been 
born in their place” (Savulescu 2001: 423).
Therefore, in Savulescu’s view the confl ict between Procreative Be-
nefi cence and Harm becomes a confl ict between an impersonal Prin-
ciple of Procreative Benefi cence and a person-affecting Principle of 
Harm. And Savulescu solves the confl ict by stating the priority of a 
person-affecting harm on an impersonal benefi cence:
In general, proscriptions against person-affecting harm should be much 
stronger than those against impersonal harms. We should not signifi cantly 
harm individuals now to bring about a better world, where the betterness 
is impersonal. Impersonal reasons then could be rather weak when pitted 
against personal reasons. Requirements of PB […] are reasons, but should 
not require major person-affecting harms. (Savulescu 2014: 178)
Therefore, Savulescu’s proposal regarding selection is a hybrid posi-
tion, which admits both impersonal and personal moral reasons for ac-
tions (and therefore impersonal and personal moral obligations) and 
states an order of priority among them (for other hybrid positions in 
future generation ethics see Mulgan 2006: 82 ff): “In my view, there 
are both person-affecting reasons and impersonal reasons. However, 
person-affecting reasons are stronger than impersonal reasons, even 
though the latter are reasons for action” (2014: 177). But, when “there 
are no competing person affecting reasons, then PB should decide the 
day” (Savulescu and Kahane 2017: 612).
In order to clarify this position, Savulescu refers to Parfi t’s example 
of the Two Medical Programmes (one for the treatment of a disease, the 
other for the prevention of a disease) in order to refuse Parfi t’s solution 
and to state the priority of person-affecting reasons over impersonal 
reasons: “personal harms are much worse than impersonal ones” (Sa-
vulescu 2014: 177).
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In this example, there are two medical programmes to detect two 
rare diseases, J and K, in women. If a pregnant woman has disease J, 
this will cause the child to have a certain handicap, but a simple treat-
ment would prevent this effect. If a non-pregnant woman has disease 
K but decides to conceive a child, this will cause the child to have the 
same handicap; disease K cannot be treated, but it can be prevented, 
because it always disappears within two months. Unfortunately, there 
are funds for only one programme. Parfi t supports the No Difference 
View between the two programmes: he believes that each programme 
is equally right because they have the same consequences in terms of 
handicapped people. On the contrary, according to Savulescu, there is 
a difference between the two programmes:
in the case of Treatment, there is person-affecting harm. If you fail to treat, 
a future person is made worse off than he or she would otherwise have been. 
In Prevention, the harm is impersonal—the world is worse for having more 
suffering than it could have contained, but no person is worse off than he or 
she would otherwise have been. (Savulescu 2014: 176–7)
This person-affecting limitation reduces the revolutionary impact of 
Procreative Benefi cence and diminishes its radicality, permitting a 
general agreement with common-sense morality. As Savulescu under-
lines: “although PB is often presented as a radical view, it is really just 
an extension of widely accepted existing practices and an application of 
common-sense ethical ideas” (Savulescu and Kahane 2017: 598).
For this reason, as we have seen, deaf or dwarf people should be al-
lowed to be free to deliberately select children with deafness or dwarfi sm:
What if a couple has in vitro fertilisation and preimplantation genetic diag-
nosis and they select a deaf embryo? Have they harmed that child? Is that 
child worse off than it would otherwise have been (that is, if they had select-
ed a different embryo)? No—another (different) child would have existed. 
The deaf child is harmed by being selected to exist only if his or her life is 
so bad it is not worth living. Deafness is not that bad (Savulescu 2002: 772).
3. Some problems
Savulescu’s theory of selection has had different kinds of critics. Some 
scholars have refused Savulescu’s position from an anti-selection point 
of view, which does not consider selection of the best child as a morally 
permissible act (because of problems related to selection procedures, De 
Melo-Martìn 2004 and 2016, or related to identifying what a best life 
is, Parker 2007). Others have refused Savulescu’s position from a lib-
eral pro-selection point of view, which does not consider selection of the 
best child as a moral obligation but only as a moral permission, not cor-
related to any duty of benefi cence (see Herisonne-Kelly 2006, Bennett 
2008, Sparrow 2014). Others have refused Savulescu’s position from 
anti-consequentialist points of view (see Stoller 2008, Hotke 2012).
Here, I will focus on some problems related to the hybrid aspect of 
the theory. “If our reasons—Savulescu writes—to have the best chil-
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dren (and best future environment) are relatively weak, they are eas-
ily overridden by person-affecting reasons” (2014: 178; Savulescu and 
Kahane 2017: 612). But, how rigid is this priority of a person-affecting 
harm over an impersonal benefi cence? Does this hierarchical priority of 
person-affecting reasons over impersonal reasons need to be affi rmed 
in every case of personal harm? How should we evaluate a selection in 
cases where the foetus shows severe handicap (but his life is however 
worth living)? In these cases, can benefi cence have a stronger infl u-
ence than harm when the severity of the handicap is relevantly high? 
Namely, how should we decide in borderline cases? There is a need for 
further specifi cation of the theory and, probably, to set some limita-
tions on the prevalence of the person-affecting principle of harm.
Secondly, it is better to distinguish the moral evaluation of the two 
different kinds of selection: in pregnancy (correlated to post-conception 
testing) and before pregnancy (correlated to pre-conception testing). 
Despite Savulescu’s comprehensive treatment of the moral evaluation 
of selection, Procreative Benefi cence becomes an all-considered moral 
obligation only in the case of pre-conception testing (PDG), but not in 
the case of post-conception testing (chorionic villus sampling or amnio-
centesis), because of the priority given to person-affecting harm. Given 
that a foetus should not be harmed, as in Savulescu’s refusal of the No 
Difference View in the Two Medical Programmes example, selection 
against the foetus in a case of pregnancy causes a personal harm to the 
foetus (killing him/her) and therefore should be avoided. In such a case 
impersonal reasons are always weaker than personal reasons.
 More in general, due to the priority given to the Principle of 
Harm, in every case of pregnancy the Principle of Procreative Benefi -
cence does not result to be, de facto, effective, and it cannot be used as 
a means to address other reproductive issues, for example the moral 
question of abortion. A severe limitation for a principle that claims to 
be a guiding principle in reproductive ethics. On the contrary, following 
an impersonal maximizing consequentialist view in a case of abortion 
and an impersonal conception of harm, Hare has compared the quality 
of the probable life of the foetus with that of a possible future child, and 
on this basis has admitted some cases of abortion:
If the present foetus is going to be miserably handicapped if it grows into an 
adult, perhaps because the mother had rubella, but there is every reason to 
suppose that the next child will be completely normal and as happy as most 
people, there would be reason to abort this foetus and proceed to bring to 
birth the next child, in that that next child will be much gladder to be alive 
than will this one. (Hare 1993: 157–8)
Because of the prevalence of the person-affecting Principle of Harm, 
this pro-abortion argument based on an impersonal conception of harm 
is precluded to Savulescu.
Thirdly, as an impersonal maximization principle of well-being, PB 
should be extended to different quantity people choice, even in the case 
of selection. A maximizing conception of benefi cence requires that less 
 S. F. Magni, Procreative Benefi cence toward Whom? 77
quality should be compensated with more quantity: two less good is 
better than one good. So, in a case of Pre-implantation Genetic Diagno-
sis, impersonal maximizing Procreative Benefi cence requires that we 
should implant the highest number of healthy embryos in order to have 
the highest number of future healthy children and the greatest quan-
tity of well-being. Similarly, in a case of post-conception testing on two 
asthmatic twin embryos it requires that we should select in favour of 
the two asthmatic embryos rather than in favour of one future healthy 
child.
This extension from quality to quantity complicates the matter, be-
cause it implies other problems: the moral obligation to increase the 
number of healthy children, namely to procreate as many children as 
possible (up to Parfi t’s Repugnant Conclusion on the increasing popula-
tion), and the necessity to distinguish a Total from an Average version 
of the Principle of Benefi cence to try to avoid this problem. That is, it 
brings with it all the puzzles of future generation ethics (see also Ben-
nett 2014).
Indeed, Savulescu explicitly limits the Principle of Procreative Be-
nefi cence to same quantity people choice: “it is a claim only about same 
number choice: about selection of one child out of those possible. It is 
not meant to offer guidance in choices between, e.g. one versus several 
children of differing endowments” (2009: 274). But this limitation seems 
to be an ad hoc manoeuvre, just in order to avoid these problems. If PB 
is a consequentialist maximizing principle, as Savulescu states, it is im-
plausible to exclude a priori any extension to different quantity people 
choice, if the principle purports to remain a maximizing principle.
4. Person-affecting procreative benefi cence
As proposed by Savulescu, the Principle of Procreative Benefi cence is 
impersonal, but it could have different interpretations. Savulescu rec-
ognizes two different ways of interpreting it:
like competing principles of procreative ethics, PB is compatible with differ-
ent accounts of reasons to select future children. It can take either a wide 
person-affecting form or an impersonal form. According to the wide person-
affecting version, our reason to select the child with better prospects is that 
that child will benefi t more than the other would by being caused to exist. 
According to the impersonal version, our reason is that selecting the most 
advantaged child would make the outcome better, even if it is not better for 
the child created. It is possible to support PB on either view (Savulescu and 
Kahane 2009: 277).
The two interpretations have the same consequences in terms of moral 
consideration of selection, and Savulescu opposes these versions of PB 
against the perspective contrary to selection (the Anti-Selection view) 
and other pro-selection perspectives (the Procreative Autonomy view, 
the Minimal Threshold view, the Satisfi cing view and the Prevention of 
Harm view) (Savulescu and Kahane 2009: 289).
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But there is another possible view of selection (and more generally 
of reproductive ethics) which can avoid the problems seen above (the 
confl ict between an impersonal benefi cence and a personal harm, the 
limitation of benefi cence to pre-conception selection, the extension of 
benefi cence to different quantity people choice) without renouncing a 
maximization principle: a narrow person-affecting view of Procreative 
Benefi cence, which aims to maximize the well-being of all the present 
or future existing persons affected by the action.
According to such a narrow person-affecting view (Parfi t 1984: 395), 
in the case of selection Procreative Benefi cence states that (following 
Savulescu’s formulations):
Couples (or single reproducers) should not select the child, of the 
possible children they could have, who is expected to have a life which 
is for him/her not worth living (in terms of lack of well-being), based on 
the relevant, available information.
Or, in the other formulation:
If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and 
selection is possible, then they have a signifi cant moral reason not to 
select a child, of the possible children they could have, whose life can be 
expected, in light of the relevant available information, to be for him/
her not worth living (in terms of lack of well-being).
Such a principle refers to both kinds of selection: selection in preg-
nancy (correlated to post-conception testing) and before pregnancy 
(correlated to pre-conception testing), because it exclusively considers 
the well-being of the child who will exist. Secondly, it avoids the confl ict 
between impersonal benefi cence and person-affecting harm because, 
in the case of selection, it does not need to make recourse to an obliga-
tion not to harm others in order to agree with common-sense morality. 
Thirdly, it avoids the problem of increasing the quantity of happy peo-
ple, because for the person-affecting restriction there is no obligation to 
procreate the highest number of happy children.
The consequences of such a narrow person-affecting principle of 
Procreative Benefi cence are, in part, different from Savulescu’s view: 
there is no moral obligation for the couple to select the best of the possi-
ble children, but only moral permission. In the example of rubella, such 
a view does not say to the woman that she should wait three months, 
but that she could (not taking into consideration other prudential or 
moral reasons for waiting, which may be decisive).
In part, the consequences are similar to Savulescu’s view: both al-
low several selective actions to be morally permitted (for example, to 
select in favour of an asthmatic child or a dwarf child), but not other 
selective actions (for example, to select in favour of an anencephalic 
child (Savulescu-Kahane 2017: 597)). According to this narrow person-
affecting version of Procreative Benefi cence, parents are free to select 
the best or someone less than the best, but they are not free to select 
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the worst, because such a version of PB remains a consequentialist 
maximizing view.
A narrow person-affecting Procreative Benefi cence is a pro-selection 
view that is opposed to anti-selection views which do not permit selec-
tion, but it is less strong than an impersonal (or wide person-affecting) 
PB, because—some extreme cases apart—it does not consider selection 
as a moral obligation but only as moral permission.
Yet, it is stronger than other pro-selection views, such as Procre-
ative Autonomy, because it does not allow a selection in favour of the 
worst and, when it is extended beyond selection and beyond reproduc-
tive choice, it transforms a negative duty (the obligation not to select) 
into a positive duty: the obligation to produce the best possible life for 
the child selected, maximizing his/her well-being (genetic enhancement 
included), because it remains a consequentialist maximizing principle 
of benefi cence. According to such a personal PB, for example, we have 
an obligation to make a foetus immune to dangerous viruses through 
genetic intervention, when it is possible and safe.
Differently from Procreative Autonomy and like impersonal Procre-
ative Benefi cence, such a view “is not indifferent to the choice between 
a child who will have a fulfi lling life and one who will live a brief life of 
misery and torment” (Savulescu and Khane 2009: 279).
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